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Abstract
High rewards or the threat of severe punishment provide strong motivation but also create psychological
pressure, which might induce performance decrements. By analyzing the performance of professional foot-
ball players in penalty kick situations, the paper provides empirical evidence for the existence of detrimental
incentive effects. Two pressure variables are considered in particular: (1) the importance of success and (2)
the presence of spectators. There are plenty of situations in which pressure arises in the workplace. Knowing
how individuals perform under pressure conditions is crucial because it has implications for the design of
the workplace and the design of incentive schemes.
© 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Economists widely agree that stronger incentives for better task performance induce harder
work and result in higher output, especially when stakes are sufﬁciently large. This is a standard
theoreticalresult(seePrendergast,1999forasurvey),forwhichseveralﬁeldstudieshaverecently
provided supportive empirical evidence (e.g., Lazear, 2000; Paarsch and Shearer, 1999; Shearer,
2004).1 However, high rewards or the threat of severe punishment might sometimes be perceived
as pressuring and lead to poor performance or complete failure instead. The phenomenon of
∗ Tel.: +49 228 3894 204; fax: +49 228 3894 180.
E-mail address: dohmen@iza.org.
1 Some studies have found, however, that too small monetary incentives can sometimes have a detrimental effect
on performance, presumably by crowding out other motives for the provision of effort. See, for example, Gneezy and
Rustichini (2000), Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997), as well as Frey and Jegen (2001) and references therein.
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suboptimal performance despite a high degree of achievement motivation is known as ‘choking
under pressure’ in the social psychology literature. While it is much discussed among social
psychologists, it is largely neglected in both the theoretical and empirical economics literature.2
Severalsourcesofpressurehavebeenproposedbysocialpsychologists,includingcompetitive
conditions or the magnitude of stakes or rewards to be gained (Baumeister, 1985), the importance
of achieving a success (Kleine et al., 1988), expectations of negative consequences (Paulus,
1983), and public expectations (Baumeister et al., 1985; Strauss, 1997, 1998). The mere presence
of others might also create pressure (either through interaction with other pressure variables or as
an autonomous source) and induce individuals to choke (Zajonc, 1965).3
The phenomenon that the presence of others can change individual behavior and performance,
which is known as the ‘social facilitation’ paradigm in social psychology, has since long ago
received much attention from both sociologists (e.g., Coleman, 1990) and social psychologists
(e.g., Triplett, 1898).4 According to the ‘social support hypothesis’, performance is boosted in
a friendly environment. The ‘social pressure hypothesis’, in contrast, holds that spectators, even
friendly ones, can impair performance. Recent experimental evidence on choking under pres-
sure supports the social pressure hypothesis. Strauss (1997) reports that choking occurred in an
experiment in which subjects had to perform a rowing ergometer task when the audience but not
the athlete expected success. Butler and Baumeister (1998) show that college students performed
worst on difﬁcult mental arithmetic tasks and computer games in front of a purportedly friendly
audience as compared to performance in front of a neutral or even adversarial audience.
It is of particular importance for labor economists to assess how prevalent choking is among
professional task performers and under which circumstances it occurs, not least because pressure
arisesintheworkplaceforvariousreasonsandinmanysituations.Experimentalstudiesofchoking
under pressure in the social psychology literature focus on tasks outside the workplace. Subjects
typicallyhavetoperformtasksthatareunrelatedtotheirprofessionalactivities.Knowledgeabout
how professionals perform under pressure conditions is, however, highly relevant for the design
of incentive schemes and the design of the workplace in general.
Itisgenerallydifﬁculttoobtainthekindofdatathatarerequiredtotestwhetherchokingmatters
in real world working conditions. Choking is not always easy to measure, especially when the
quality and quantity dimensions of output are difﬁcult to observe; and if output deterioration can
be measured, it is often difﬁcult to ascribe a decline unambiguously to performance decrements
caused by choking, due to the presence of other confounding factors. In order to evade such
problems, researchers can resort to data from controlled laboratory experiments, but it is not
obvious that behavior under stylized laboratory conditions generalizes to real world situations.
2 Ariely et al. (2005) have recently conducted laboratory experiments with college students and experiments in rural
India that indicate that high reward levels can have detrimental effects on performance.
3 Zajonc (1965) theorized that the presence of others interacts with task complexity, stimulating improved performance
on a simple task but inducing choking on a complex task. Zajonc et al. (1969) ﬁnd that cockroaches ﬁnd food faster in the
presence of other cockroaches in a straight maze, but are impaired by their audience if they have to ﬁnd food in a maze
with several turns.
4 SeeGuerin(1993)foranextensiveaccountoftheoreticalandempiricalsocialfacilitationresearchinsocialpsychology.
Apart from a small literature that addresses the role of social inﬂuences on behavior (see, e.g., Akerlof, 1980, 1997;
Bernheim, 1994; Becker and Murphy, 2000; Austen-Smith and Fryer, 2005) economists largely ignore that the task
environment, especially the social context, can affect psychological conditions and hence individual performance. If
social interaction is taken into account in the economics literature, as is done in the peer effects literature (e.g., Falk and
Ichino, 2006; Gneezy and Rustichini, 2004; Kandel and Lazear, 1992; Spagnolo, 1999), it is usually assumed that others
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Another alternative is to design experiments that are conducted in the work environment. The




to measure. This quite stylized situation can be described as an authentic working condition with
real incentives. Since the data are generated in a quasi-experiment under real working conditions,
the paper adds important “real world” evidence, which supplements the experimental evidence
on detrimental performance effects of high rewards (e.g., Ariely et al.).
Variation in incentives to score from the penalty mark comes from two main sources. First,
the importance of winning the match varies (being affected among others by league standings,
ﬁnancialrewards,etc.)andtheeffectofscoringonwinningprobabilitiesvarieswiththeremaining
playing time and the match score at the time when the penalty is taken. Especially high incentives
for success arise, for example, if a penalty kick is taken when the score is close and little time is
left to play. Successful performance is then even higher if much is at stake, such as if the match
outcome is crucial for winning the championship or for being relegated. Second, the incentives
to score are affected by the social context in which the task is performed. The presence of others,
including, for example, opponent players, teammates, coaches, evaluators, observers, friendly or
hostile supporters, silent, or noisy crowds can affect individual performance in different ways.5
This paper considers both sources of pressure: it examines whether performance pressure that
stems from the importance of winning and whether social pressure that arises in the presence of
others (spectators) affects the performance of professional football players on kicking from the
penalty mark.
The data cover all penalty kicks in the German Premier football league (First Bundesliga)
sinceitsfoundationin1963untiltheendoftheseason2003/2004.Thesedatalendthemselvesfor
studying whether the social environment, the importance of success or high ﬁnancial stakes can
cause professionals to choke under pressure. First, the task of kicking a penalty is well-deﬁned.
Successful performance is clearly and easily measured. Second, kicking from the penalty mark
is a well-learned skill of professional football players so that the results are not confounded by
learning the sensorimotor skills that are required for the task. Third, there is variation concerning
the composition of the crowd and its relation to the kicker, the number of spectators, and the
importance of success stemming from sportive or ﬁnancial motives.
One drawback is that the data are generated in a two-person strategic game, so that successful
performance does not depend on the kicker’s performance alone. This would be problematic
if the players systematically relied on different strategies under pressure conditions and if the
probabilitytochokedependedontheplayers’strategies.Butanempiricalanalysisofthestrategic
interaction,itsdependenceonpressureconditions,anditsimpactonchokingprobabilitiesreveals
that players’ strategies are independent of conditions and that choking occurs independent of the
players’ choice of action.
Although penalties are sometimes saved due to excellent goalkeeping rather than due to lack
of kicking performance, poorly kicked penalties are typically more likely to be saved. In order
to avoid any ambiguity as to why a shot on target was saved by the goalkeeper, I use a strict
deﬁnition of choking, namely failing to score on a penalty kick by missing the goal without the
5 Dashiell(1935)characterizesdifferenttypesofpresentothersbytheirrelationtotheactor,theirattributes(size,status),
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goalkeeper’s interference (i.e., by shooting wide or high, or by hitting the cross bar or the posts,
which clearly produces conservative estimates for the prevalence of choking). As a robustness
check, I then analyze choking in a Multinomial Logit regression framework with saved penalties
as a third outcome category.
The evidence suggests that the social environment has an impact on the performance of indi-
viduals. In particular, players of the home team are more likely to choke. This is a very robust
ﬁnding in the data. It provides evidence against the social support hypothesis, but in support of
the hypothesis that positive public expectations induce choking. Interestingly, the data provide no
evidence that high stakes or the importance of success induce choking. If anything, professional
football players are less likely to choke when much is at stakes and competition incentives are
high. This ﬁnding indicates that increased incentives induce better performance of professionals,
who can evidently deal with this kind of performance pressure.6
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3
provides some background information about the procedural rules concerning penalty kicks, and
itaddressesaspectsofthestrategicinteractionbetweengoalkeepersandkickers.Section4reports
the results of the empirical analysis of choking. Section 5 discusses the ﬁndings and concludes.
2. Data
I analyze data on all penalty kicks awarded in German premier football league (First Bun-
desliga) matches since its foundation in 1963 until the end of the season 2003/2004. Eighteen
teams compete in the First Bundesliga for the national football championship.7 Teams play each
other twice during a season, once on the home turf and once in the opponent’s stadium, so that
a season consists of 306 matches that are scheduled in 34 rounds of 9 games each that typically
take place on weekends.8
The winner of a league match had received two points until 1995, but since the start of the
1995/1996 season a winning team is awarded three points. Teams receive one point for a draw.
No points are allocated for a defeat. The league ranking is determined by the number of points
accumulated throughout the season. If two or more teams are tied on points, the superior goal
difference and then the higher number of goals determine which team is ranked in higher position
of the league table. The team that heads the league table at the end of the season wins the German
National Football championship, the most important trophy in German professional football. The
6 There is anecdotal evidence, however, that players choke on a penalty kick in extreme pressure situations. The most
well-known case of choking occurred in the second-to-last round of the season 1985/1986. Werder Bremen, the team that
was heading the championship table, could have secured the championship by a victory over runner-up Bayern M¨ unchen.
Bremen was awarded a penalty kick in the 89th minute at tied score. But the penalty kick by Michael Kutzop, who had
converted all 9 penalty kicks he had taken in previous league matches, hit the post. Bremen tied this game and lost its last
game of the season, thereby losing the championship to Bayern M¨ unchen. Kutzop converted all 8 penalty kicks that he
took thereafter. A similar situation occurred in the 33rd round of the season 2003/2004 when Kioyo of 1860 M¨ unchen
choked on a penalty kick in the 89th minute by shooting wide. The match ended drawn and 1860 M¨ unchen was relegated
to the second division (Second Bundesliga).
7 The First Bundesliga was founded in 1963 with 16 teams. Since the start of the 1965/1966 season, 18 teams have
competed in the First Bundesliga, the only exception being the 1991/1992 season when the league was temporarily
enlarged to 20 teams in order to accommodate two additional former East German clubs after the merger of the West and
East German football associations.
8 Sometimes a round is scheduled during the week, usually on Tuesdays and Wednesdays, because there are sometimes
toofewweekendsavailableforschedulingleaguematches.Notealsothatthenumberofmatchesandroundswasdifferent
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threelowest-rankingclubsofthechampionshiptablearerelegatedtotheseconddivision(Second
Bundesliga) being replaced by the three highest-ranking teams from the second division. Apart
from winning the championship or avoiding relegation there are other important sporting and
ﬁnancial incentives to ﬁnishing in high ranks of the championship table because the rankings
determine eligibility for various football club competitions on the European level.
The data on league matches contain information on opponents, the location, date, attendance,
goals, the score at any time during the match, as well as detailed information about penalty kicks,
including the names of the kickers and the goalies, the minute the penalty kick was taken, and
the outcome of the penalty kick. Additional information on the outcomes of all other games
in the Bundesliga’s history allows us to calculate the opponents’ pre-match league rankings. In
total, referees ruled in favor of penalty kicks 3619 times in the 12,488 matches of the ﬁrst 41
Bundesliga seasons; 2687 of these penalty kicks were immediately converted into a goal (74.25
percent), 680 (18.79 percent) were saved by the goalie, and 252 (6.96 percent) penalty kicks
missedthegoal,i.e.,theballhittingthepostorcrossbarortheballbeingkickedwideorabovethe
cross bar (see Table 1). The penalty kicks involved 704 kickers and 282 goalkeepers of 48 teams.
Additionaldescriptivestatisticsconcerningplayers’experienceandmatchattendancearelistedin
Table 1.
Fig. 1 reveals that the scoring rate and the number of penalties imposed varies by season.
The scoring rate trended upwards until the late 1970s, probably because football became more
professional and players became more skilled and experienced. The scoring rate remained rather
stable thereafter until the mid 1990s, and it does not seem to have been affected by the change
in procedural rules that occurred in 1986. It appears, however, that the rule change in 1997,
which allows goalkeepers to move on the goal line before the ball has been kicked, has caused a
structural change in the scoring probability. The ﬁgure also shows that the home team is granted
more penalty kicks in every season, but this gap has diminished in the last two decades. On
average, the home team is awarded more than twice as many penalty kicks. While most of this
difference is the result of different playing strategies of home and visiting teams, part of this gap
might be caused by preferential treatment given to the home team by the referee. Such home bias
is likely to be induced by social pressure on the referee exerted by the home crowd (see Dohmen,
2005).
Table 1
Descriptive statistics of penalty kicks in the ﬁrst German Football League (First Bundesliga)
Number of penalty kicks 3619
Number of penalty kicks converted 2687
Number of penalty kicks saved by goalkeeper 680
Number of penalty kicks missed by choking 252
Number of teams 48
Number of kickers 704
Number of keepers 282
Average number of penalty kicks by kickers (S.D.) 5.14 (6.94)
Average number of penalty kicks by keepers (S.D.) 12.83 (16.30)
Average experience of kickers (S.D.) 6.75 (9.17)
Average experience of keepers (S.D.) 16.23 (16.70)
Average attendance in thousands (S.D.) 24.635 (14.325)
Average capacity utilization (S.D.) 0.54 (0.27)
Notes: The table shows descriptive statistics for penalty kicks in the ﬁrst German Football League (First Bundesliga).
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Fig. 1. Incidence and outcomes of penalty kicks in league matches over time. (a) Rates of converted and missed penalty
kicks and (b) Number of penalty kicks. Notes: Panel (a) shows the fraction of converted penalties, the fraction of penalties
saved by the goalkeeper and the fraction of penalties missed due to choking over time. The vertical line mark dates of
changes in procedural rules. Panel (b) plots the total number of penalty kicks that have been awarded in a season and the
number of those penalties that were awarded to the home team.
3. The penalty kick
According to Law 14 of the Laws of the Game (see FIFA, 2003) a penalty kick is awarded
against a team that commits one of the offenses, for which a direct free kick is awarded, inside
its own penalty area while the ball is in play.9 A penalty kick is carried out as follows. The ball is
9 See FIFA (2003) for a list of these offenses.642 T.J. Dohmen / J. of Economic Behavior & Org. 65 (2008) 636–653
placed on the penalty mark and a properly identiﬁed player takes the penalty kick by kicking the
ball forward.10 The defending goalkeeper remains on his goal line, facing the kicker, between the
goalposts until the ball is kicked. All other players are located outside the penalty area, behind the
penaltymarkandatleast10yardsawayfromthepenaltymark.Iftheplayertakingthekickorone
of his team mates infringes on the Laws of the Game, the referee allows the kick to proceed but
has it retaken if the ball enters the goal. The penalty kick is not retaken if no goal is scored despite
rule infringement. Likewise, a penalty kick is retaken if the goalkeeper or one of his teammates
infringes the laws of the game and the ball does not enter the goal.
There have been three changes in procedural rules. (1) The player taking the kick has to be
properly identiﬁed since the start of the season 1986/1987. (2) All players except the penalty
kicker and the defending goalkeeper have to be located behind the penalty mark since the start
of the season 1996/1997. (3) The goalkeeper is allowed to move on the goal line before the ball
has been kicked only since the start of the season 1997/1998. Panel (a) of Fig. 1 suggests that
the last rule change, in particular, has improved the goalkeeper’s position. This is not surprising,
because the ball is kicked at such speed that the goalkeeper has to jump to a corner before the ball
is kicked in order to have a chance to save a penalty kick. On average, the ball is kicked at a speed
of about 100km/h so that it enters the goal after roughly half a second. Taking into account the
reaction time of a proﬁcient goalie, which is about a quarter of a second, the goalkeeper would
have to jump at a speed of 35km/h, faster than a professional sprinter runs the 100m dash, if he
is to catch the ball in the remaining quarter of a second.
It is generally believed that the kicker also decides on the side of the kick before the keeper
moves. Penalty kicking can, therefore, be described as a two-player simultaneous-move game.
Chiappori et al. (2002) and Palacios-Huerta (2003) analyze the strategic nature of the interaction
between the goalkeeper and the kicker. They ﬁnd that outcomes in this one-shot two-person
zero-sum game are remarkably consistent with equilibrium play implied by von Neumann’s
Minimax theorem. These results are broadly conﬁrmed by the data on Bundesliga penalties (see
Supplementary data). The detailed additional information that is required to analyze the strategic
interaction between the goalie (the side of the kick chosen by the kicker, the side of the goalie’s
jump, and whether the kicker is right-footed or left-footed) has been recorded only since the start
oftheseason1993/1994andavailablefor857outofthe858penaltiesthathavebeentakenduring
this period.11 There are two types of kickers: left-footed and right-footed.12 The data corroborate
the conventional wisdom that left-footed players ﬁnd it easier to kick to their right, while right-
footed players ﬁnd it easier to kick to their left: left-footed (right-footed) players choose their
“natural” side (i.e., strong side) in 45.3 (47.2) percent of cases, the center in 13.5 (9.3) percent of
cases, and the weak side in 41.2 (43.5) percent of cases. Since these are equilibrium choices, it
is not surprising that scoring rates are the same across these strategies. The strategic response of
10 The penalty mark is inside the penalty area, rectangle 18 yards×44 yards. It is 12 yards from the midpoint between
the goalposts and equidistant to them. The goal consists of two upright posts joined at the top by a horizontal crossbar.
The posts are 8 yards apart and the crossbar is 8 feet from the ground. Goalposts and the crossbar have the same width
and depth, which must not exceed 12in. The player taking the penalty is not allowed to play the ball a second time until
another player has touched it.
11 The information on the side the goalie chooses to jump to is missing for one kick of a right-footed kicker to his left.
This kick hit the post.
12 Roughly 15–20% of all players are left-footed kickers. Although most penalty kickers since 1993/1994 are right-
footed, the fraction of penalties kicked by a left-footed kicker (311 out of 858) is disproportionately high, suggesting that
left-footed kickers have a higher propensity to take a penalty kick. Both left-footed kickers and right-footed kickers take
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goalies, who are obviously aware of the kickers’ preferences, is to jump to a kicker’s natural side
in 52.0 percent of cases, to stay in the center in 1.8 percent of cases and to jump to the kicker’s
nonnatural side in 46.3 percent of cases. In the remainder of the paper I denote the kickers’
stragegies by ‘NS’ (kick to natural side), ‘Center’ (kick to center) and ‘OS’ (kick to non-natural
side), and keepers’s strategies by ‘ns’ (jump to kicker’s natural side), ‘center’ (remaining in the
center of the goal), and ‘os’ (jump to kicker’s non-natural side).
Chiappori et al. show that the game, which belongs to the “matching penny” family, has no
pure-strategy equilibrium, but that it has a unique mixed strategy equilibrium under conditions
statedintheirproposition1.Theyderivethepropertiesofthisequilibriumunderassumptionsthat
are also supported by our data (see Supplementary data). What is important for the analysis in
this paper is that the strategy of kickers (and of goalkeepers) is neither related to the attributes of
the crowd nor to the importance of scoring on the penalty kick (see Table A.1 in Supplementary
data). Throughout the analysis in the following section, I will also show that the results are robust
to controls for kickers’ strategic choices.
4. Empirical analysis
4.1. Testing the social support hypothesis against the choking hypothesis
It is debated whether social support leads to improved performance, possibly through encour-
agement expressed by an audience (e.g., Coleman, 1988), or whether the mere presence of
spectators or public expectations (e.g., Baumeister et al., 1985; Strauss, 1998) can cause per-
formancedecrements.Ifthesocialsupporthypothesisweretrue,weshouldexpectthehometeam
tohaveahigherscoringratethanthevisitingteamsimplybecausehometeamsupporterstypically
make up the larger fraction of the crowd and can thus express their support more strongly. The
opposite is true, however, as Table 2 reveals. The table summarizes the outcomes of penalty kicks
in league matches by home status. The visiting team’s scoring rate (75.83 percent) is higher than
thatofthehometeam(73.59percent).Intriguingly,almost90percentofthe2.24percentagepoint
gap in performance is due to choking: shooting wide, above the cross bar, or hitting the frame.
Less than 10 percent of this gap is explained by more penalties being saved by the goalie.
Thehypothesisthatoutcomesforthehomeandthevisitingteamaregeneratedbythesamepro-
cess (i.e., that observed differences in the frequencies of the three categories in Table 2 are purely
due to chance) is rejected by a chi-square test at the 10 percent signiﬁcance level (χ2(2)=4.70). A
Fisher exact test rejects the null hypothesis that players of the home and visiting team are equally
Table 2
Outcomes of penalty kicks in the ﬁrst German Football League (First Bundesliga) by home status
Home Visitor
Number Percentage Number Percentage
Converted 1884 73.59 803 75.83
Saved by goalkeeper 483 18.87 197 18.60
Missed by choking 193 7.54 59 5.57
Total 2560 100.00 1059 100.00
Notes: The table shows absolute numbers of penalty kicks in the First German Football League (First Bundesliga) and
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likely to miss the goal by choking even at the 5 percent signiﬁcance level (χ2(1)-statistic=4.18).
This lends considerable support for the choking hypothesis.
In order to control for other confounding factors that affect the probability of choking, such
as experience and different procedural rules, Probit regression models for the probability that
a player misses a penalty kick by kicking it wide, high, or hitting the frame in league matches
are estimated and the results are reported in Table 3. The most parsimonious model in column
(1) indicates that professional football players in the German First Bundesliga are 2 percent
more likely to choke on the home turf (note that the table reports marginal effects, i.e., the
change in the probability for an inﬁnitesimal change in a continuous variable and the discrete
change in the probability for dummy variables). This effect is statistically signiﬁcantly different
from zero at the 5 percent signiﬁcance level (p-value equals 0.033). This effect is robust to
alternativespeciﬁcations,ascolumns(2)–(5)show,andtocontrollingthekickers’strategicchoice
(column (6)).
The coefﬁcient estimates of these alternative model speciﬁcations indicate that variations in
the size of the audience, measured in thousands of spectators by the variable “Attendance”, do not
affect choking and that the density of spectators, which is measured as the capacity utilization of
the stadium, has a positive but statistically insigniﬁcant impact on choking. Moreover, choking
tendstobecomelesslikelyifthephysicaldistancebetweenthecrowdandtheﬁeldincreases.This
is suggested by the negative, but statistically insigniﬁcant coefﬁcient of the indicator variable that
equals 1 if an athletics track separates the stands from the ﬁeld (see column (4)). The model in
column (5) shows that proximity of the spectators has a larger adverse effect on the performance
of home team kickers than on players of the visiting team. These differential effects are, however,
not statistically signiﬁcant and should not be overvalued. Importantly, the results in column (6),
which replicates the model from column (4) for the sub-sample of penalties that were taken since
1993 with controls for strategic choices, show that kickers are more likely to choke on a penalty
kick when playing at the home turf, independent of their strategic choice.13
The coefﬁcient for home status is of the same order of magnitude as for the whole sample,
even if the kickers’ strategic choices are controlled, and it is statistically signiﬁcant.14
An interesting ﬁnding, which Fig. 1 already foreshadowed, is that choking is generally more
prevalent in earlier football seasons. This is reﬂected in falling estimated base rates for successive
periods following changes in procedural rules (measured by the controls for “Intercepts”) and
decreasing time trends (slope coefﬁcients) therein.15 The reference time period spans the ﬁrst 23
seasons and the reference slope coefﬁcient is zero (i.e., the time trend in the reference period, the
single season 1996/1997, is zero by deﬁnition). It is clear that choking becomes less likely over
time.Theprobabilityofchokingfallswithinperiodsexceptfortheperiodstartingwiththeseason
1997/1998 when the rule that goalkeeper’s could move on the line before the kick is taken was
introduced. A plausible explanation is that players are distracted by the goalkeepers’ movements
andthereforechokeorthattheyaremorejumpilybecauseitbecomesmoredifﬁculttoconvertthe
penalty kick. But we should not construe to much meaning into this estimate since the evidence
for a structural break at this particular point is weak and not statistically signiﬁcant.
13 Note that analogously augmented regression models of Columns (1)–(3) and Column (5), which are not reported here,
alsoshowthatcoefﬁcientestimatesarerobustandthatstrategicchoicesdonotaffectthechokingprobabilitysigniﬁcantly.
14 The results do not change when keepers’ choices are also controlled.
15 The variable time trend is estimated for a sequence that starts at a value of one (for the ﬁrst season within a given
























































Spectators and the probability to choke: Probit estimates
Dependent variable: 1 if choking
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dummy, 1 if home 0.020** [0.009] 0.017** [0.009] 0.017** [0.009] 0.017** [0.009] 0.021 [0.014] 0.025* [0.013]
Capacity utilization 0.021 [0.024] 0.019 [0.024] 0.015 [0.027] 0.015 [0.027] 0.011 [0.043]
Attendance 0.000 [0.000] 0.000 [0.000] 0.000 [0.000] 0.000 [0.000] 0.000 [0.001]
Dummy, 1 if track −0.003 [0.010] 0.001 [0.018] −0.024 [0.019]
Dummy, 1 if home and track −0.006 [0.019]
Intercepts
1986–1995 −0.045*** [0.016] −0.034** [0.017] −0.035** [0.017] −0.035** [0.017] 0.045 [0.086]
1996 −0.046*** [0.013] −0.041*** [0.014] −0.042*** [0.014] −0.041*** [0.014] 0.013 [0.038]
1997–2003 −0.069*** [0.013] −0.066*** [0.013] −0.066*** [0.013] −0.066*** [0.013] −0.010 [0.034]
Slopes
1963–1985 −0.004*** [0.001] −0.003*** [0.001] −0.003*** [0.001] −0.003*** [0.001]
1986–1995 −0.004 [0.003] −0.004 [0.003] −0.004 [0.003] −0.004 [0.003] −0.030 [0.035]
1997–2003 0.008 [0.006] 0.008 [0.006] 0.007 [0.006] 0.007 [0.006] 0.004 [0.005]
Experience of keeper 0.000 [0.000] 0.000 [0.000] 0.000 [0.000] 0.000 [0.000]
Experience of kicker −0.001*** [0.001] −0.001*** [0.001] −0.001*** [0.001] −0.001 [0.001]
Kicker plays ‘NS’ 0.013 [0.014]
Kicker plays ‘Center’ −0.025 [0.018]
Pseudo-R2 0.003 0.023 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.046
Number of observations 3619 3606 3606 3606 3606 857
Notes: The table shows marginal effects estimates of Probit models for the probability to choke. The dependent variable equals 1 if the kicker misses the penalty kick by kicking
it wide, high or by hitting the bars. It equals 0 otherwise. Standard errors are in brackets below the coefﬁcients.
* Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10 percent level.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5 percent level.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1 percent level.646 T.J. Dohmen / J. of Economic Behavior & Org. 65 (2008) 636–653
Theregressionmodelsincolumns(3)–(5)alsoindicatethattheprobabilityofchokingfallswith
experiencemeasuredasthenumberofpenaltykicksthataplayerhastakeninpreviousBundesliga
matches. An important caveat to this estimate is, however, that an endogeneity problem arises if
players retire from penalty kicking after having failed on a penalty kick. Since the focus was to
examine the robustness of the ‘home effect’, this endogeneity problem is not addressed in more
detail here.16 The major conclusion that can be drawn from Table 3 is that players are more likely
to choke on a penalty kick when the action takes place at the home turf.
Reassuringly,theresultsfrommultinomiallogitregressionswiththreecategoriesofthedepen-
dent variable (converting a penalty kick, missing it due to the goalkeeper saving it, and missing
it due to choking) are qualitatively the same. In addition, factors that trigger choking also tend
to increase the probability that the penalty kick is missed due to the goalkeeper saving it. This
suggests that these factors tend to affect performance of the kicker adversely. Table 4 reports the
results for three models that are speciﬁed analogously to the models in columns (1) and (4) of
Table 3. Again, the results for model (3), which is estimated on the sample for the period from
1993 to 2004 and in which strategic choices are added as control variables, are qualitatively and
quantitatively very similar to the estimates of model (2).
Interestingly, home status raises the choking probability the most (by 3.5 percentage points,
p-value=0.026) when the game is tied. Conditional on particular score differences at the time
when the penalty kick is taken (being more than 2 goals behind in score, 2 goals behind, 1 goal
behind, 1 goal ahead, 2 goals ahead or more than 2 goals ahead) home team players are always
more likely to choke than penalty kickers of the visiting team, but the estimated effect is typically
smaller and never statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels.17 This ﬁnding suggests that there
is some interaction between the importance of success and the presence of a supportive crowd.
An intriguing question is whether choking is caused by physically facing a friendly crowd
when performing the task or whether it is caused by the pressure created by positive expectations
of the social environment. Ideally, one would like to control for the number of supporters that
are near or behind the goal where the penalty kick is taken, but this information is not available.
Since the home team usually plays into the direction of its supporters block in the second half,
I analyze whether home team players are more likely to choke in the second half. The results in
Table 5 indicate that the home team is more likely to choke than the visiting team in the ﬁrst half
only. Note that the results are qualitatively and quantitatively very similar when estimated on the
sub-sample of data with controls for kickers’ strategic choices (columns (4)–(6)). To the extent
that players are really more likely to face home team supporters in the second half, these results
conﬂict with the idea that friendly faces per se induce choking. Instead, choking is more likely
when the expectation of successful performance is generally high in the social environment and
the kicker is at the same time confronted with hostile faces.
4.2. Choking and the importance of success
Incentive theory postulates that effort will be higher and performance consequently better the
stronger incentives for good performance are. In the context of taking a penalty kick in a football
match, this implies that we should expect less choking and a higher scoring rate in situations in
16 Most players have, in fact, failed on the last penalty kick they have taken. However, the effect that choking is more
likely to occur at home remains (and is even stronger) when neglecting a player’s last penalty kick.























































Spectators and the probability to choke: Multinomial Logit estimates
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
Saved Choking Saved Choking Saved Choking
Dummy, 1 if home 0.044[0.094] 0.332** [0.155] 0.059 [0.095] 0.307** [0.156] 0.050 [0.183] 0.644* [0.388]
Capacity utilization −251.23 [286.561] 174.934 [440.804] −0.446 [0.522] 0.435 [1.031]
Attendance 0.005 [0.005] 0.001 [0.008] −0.002 [0.007] 0.008 [0.012]
Dummy, 1 if track −0.059 [0.105] −0.065 [0.161] −0.163 [0.223] −0.537 [0.421]
Intercepts
1986–1995 −0.135 [0.239] −0.636* [0.369] −0.498 [0.796] 0.964 [1.407]
1996 −0.048 [0.311] −0.928* [0.498] 0.531 [0.459] 0.417 [0.769]
1997–2003 0.386 [0.271] −1.451*** [0.506] 0.819* [0.446] −0.025 [0.804]
Slopes
1963–1985 −0.007 [0.009] −0.045*** [0.013]
1986–1995 0.000 [0.032] −0.078 [0.057] 0.596 [0.425] −0.716 [0.902]
1997–2003 −0.076 [0.055] 0.102 [0.100] −0.032 [0.062] 0.076 [0.117]
Experience of keeper −0.002 [0.003] −0.007 [0.005] −0.006 [0.006] 0.000 [0.010]
Experience of kicker −0.014*** [0.005] −0.028*** [0.010] −0.005 [0.012] −0.031 [0.026]
Kicker plays ‘NS’ −0.1 [0.186] 0.251 [0.332]
Kicker plays ‘Center’ 0.510* [0.263] −0.639 [0.766]
Constant −1.405*** [0.080] −2.611*** [0.135] −1.175*** [0.196] −1.677*** [0.284] −1.328** [0.552] −3.688*** [1.073]
Pseudo-R2 0.001 0.013 0.029
Number of observations 3619 3606 857
Notes: The table shows estimates of Multinomial Logit models for the outcome of a penalty kick. The dependent variable equals 0 if the kicker scores on the penalty kick, 1 if
the goalkeeper saves it, and 2 if the kick is missed due to choking. Standard errors are in brackets below the coefﬁcients.
* Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10 percent level.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5 percent level.























































Probability to choke: further Probit Estimates
Dependent variable: 1 if choking
(1) Whole match (2) First half (3) Second half (4) Whole match (5) First half (6) Second half
Dummy, 1 if home 0.016* [0.009] 0.030** [0.014] 0.007 [0.011] 0.024* [0.013] 0.036** [0.015] 0.007 [0.016]
Capacity utilization 0.019 [0.023] 0.007 [0.038] 0.025 [0.029] 0.042 [0.033] 0.062 [0.041] 0.019 [0.037]
Attendance 0.000 [0.000] 0.000 [0.001] 0.000 [0.001] 0.000 [0.001] 0.000 [0.001] 0.000 [0.001]
Intercepts
1986–1995 −0.035** [0.017] 0.020 [0.038] −0.067*** [0.017] 0.042 [0.111] 0.951*** [0.056] 0.065 [0.111]
1996 −0.042*** [0.014] −0.018 [0.034] −0.054*** [0.009] 0.010 [0.036] 0.003 [0.035] −0.001 [0.042]
1997–2003 −0.066*** [0.013] −0.063*** [0.023] −0.064*** [0.015] −0.013 [0.034] −0.044 [0.049] 0.017 [0.036]
Slopes
1963–1985 −0.003*** [0.001] −0.003** [0.001] −0.003*** [0.001]
1986–1995 −0.004 [0.003] −0.014** [0.006] 0.003 [0.004] −0.027 [0.035] −0.310*** [0.083] −0.015 [0.034]
1997–2003 0.007 [0.006] 0.010 [0.009] 0.006 [0.007] 0.005 [0.005] 0.008 [0.005] 0.000 [0.006]
Experience of keeper 0.000 [0.000] −0.001 [0.000] 0.000 [0.000] 0.000 [0.000] 0.000 [0.001] 0.000 [0.000]
Experience of kicker −0.001*** [0.001] −0.002** [0.001] −0.001 [0.001] −0.001 [0.001] 0.000 [0.001] −0.001 [0.001]
Dummy, 1 if ﬁrst half 0.015* [0.008] 0.027* [0.015]
Kicker plays ‘NS’ 0.012 [0.014] 0.006 [0.015] 0.010 [0.017]
Kicker plays ‘Center’ −0.023 [0.018] 0.001 [0.028]
Pseudo-R2 0.030 0.041 0.032 0.052 0.110 0.020
Number of observations 3606 1466 2140 857 299 525
Notes: The table shows marginal effects estimates of Probit models for the probability to choke. The dependent variable equals 1 if the kicker misses the penalty kick by kicking
it wide, high or by hitting the bars. It equals 0 otherwise. Probit models in columns [2,3] include the same set of controls as speciﬁcation [4] in Table 3. Standard errors are in
brackets below the coefﬁcients. No kicker who played “Center” in the ﬁrst half during the period from 1993 to 2004 choked, so that 33 observations are not used in the estimation
in column (5).
* Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10 percent level.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5 percent level.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1 percent level.T.J. Dohmen / J. of Economic Behavior & Org. 65 (2008) 636–653 649
which the outcome of the kick has a strong impact on the outcome of the match. If the importance
of success, on the other hand, creates pressure on the kicker that induces him to choke, we should
expect the choking rate to be highest when converting the penalty kick is most vital.
One obvious proxy for the importance of success is the score in the match at the time when the
penalty kick is taken. Fig. 2 plots the scoring and the choking rate at various score differences,
which are calculated by subtracting the number of goals scored by the keeper’s team from the
goals scored by the kicker’s team at the time when the penalty kick is taken. When the kicker
can tie the match or can bring his team into the lead by scoring, the choking rate is lower than
when his team is already leading by one or two goals or when his team is two goals behind. This
implies that choking is less likely the more success matters for the outcome of the match, which
contradicts the choking hypothesis but supports incentive theory. A notable caveat is, however,
that the choking rate is even lower if one team is leading by three or more goals.
Fig. 3 shows how choking rates, conditional on the score difference when the penalty kick is
taken, change during the match. If anything, choking rates tend to fall towards the end of matches
in which the score is close at the time the penalty kick is taken. Choking rates tend to rise towards
the end of matches, in which the kicker’s team is either ahead or behind by two goals. Choking
rates at higher score differences (not shown in the ﬁgure) also tend to rise towards the end of the
match.Thesegraphicalresultssuggestthatchokingbecomeslesslikelywhenmoreisatstake(i.e.,
when the score is close and little time is left to play). This, again, substantiates incentive theory.
In order to assess whether the graphical results bear up under more scrutiny, I estimate Probit
models and assess their statistical signiﬁcance. The estimates in Table 6 show that differences in
chokingratesbyscoredifferencearenotstatisticallysigniﬁcantatconventionallevelsirrespective
of differences in model speciﬁcation (columns (1)–(4)), although the pattern that choking is less
likely if the score is drawn or if the kicker’s team is one goal behind in score, which was captured
by Fig. 2, reappears. The same holds for the pattern depicted by Fig. 3: interaction terms between
Fig. 2. Scoring rates and choking rates by score difference. Notes: The ﬁgure plots the scoring rate and the choking rate
for various score differences from the perspective of the kicker. The score differences measure the number of goals that
the kicker’s team is ahead (positive numbers) or behind (negative numbers) when the penalty kick is awarded (i.e., at the























































The importance of success and the probability to choke: Probit estimates
Dependent variable: 1 if choking
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dummies for score difference
if 1 goal ahead 0.006 [0.012] 0.005 [0.012] 0.005 [0.012] 0.004 [0.012] −0.008 [0.019] −0.004 [0.019]
if 2 goals ahead 0.011 [0.018] 0.008 [0.017] 0.008 [0.017] 0.009 [0.017] 0.038 [0.039] 0.048 [0.044]
if >2 goals ahead −0.019 [0.017] −0.022 [0.015] −0.022 [0.015] −0.023 [0.015]
if 1 goal behind 0.000 [0.012] 0.005 [0.012] 0.005 [0.012] 0.005 [0.012] 0.004 [0.012] 0.006 [0.012]
if 2 goals behind 0.010 [0.018] 0.018 [0.019] 0.018 [0.019] 0.017 [0.018] 0.030 [0.039] 0.030 [0.039]
if >2 goals behind −0.003 [0.021] 0.004 [0.022] 0.004 [0.023] 0.002 [0.022] −0.011 [0.037] −0.010 [0.037]
Dummy, 1 if ﬁrst half of season 0.000 [0.008] −0.007 [0.014]
Dummies for rounds to play
1 if last round of season 0.019 [0.019] 0.038 [0.043]
1 if 2 rounds to play −0.014 [0.021] 0.000 [0.045]
1 if 3 rounds to play −0.024 [0.019]
1 if 4 rounds to play 0.008 [0.027] 0.016 [0.045]
1 if 5 rounds to play 0.015 [0.027] 0.039 [0.062]
1 if 6 rounds to play −0.041*** [0.014] 0.028 [0.066]
1 if 7 rounds to play 0.013 [0.028] 0.066 [0.073]
1 if 8 rounds to play 0.026 [0.030] 0.091 [0.078]
1 if 9 rounds to play −0.037** [0.016] 0.039 [0.055]
1 if 10 rounds to play 0.023 [0.028] 0.023 [0.063]
Kicker plays ‘NS’ 0.015 [0.015] 0.014 [0.015]
Kicker plays ‘Center’ −0.026 [0.019] −0.028 [0.017]
Additional controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo-R2 0.001 0.030 0.030 0.037 0.056 0.073
Number of observations 3619 3606 3606 3606 819 800
Notes: The table shows marginal effects estimates of Probit models for the probability to choke. The dependent variable equals 1 if the kicker misses the penalty kick by kicking
it wide, high or by hitting the bars. It equals 0 otherwise. Standard errors are in brackets below the coefﬁcients. Additional controls include the same variables as in Table 3 (i.e.,
home status, attendance-to-capacity ratio, indicator for presence of athletics track, splines for time trend, as well as experience of keeper and kicker). No kicker chokes being
two or more goals in the lead in the sub-sample of data from 1993 to 2004, on which the models in columns (5) and (6) are estimated. Also, no player chokes in the third to last
round from 1993 to 2004.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5 percent level.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1 percent level.T.J. Dohmen / J. of Economic Behavior & Org. 65 (2008) 636–653 651
Fig. 3. Scoring/choking rates by score difference. Notes: The ﬁgure plots choking rates in 5-min time intervals during
the match conditional on the score difference from the kicker’s perspective when the penalty kick is taken. The choking
rate equals one in the ﬁrst 5-min interval when the kicker’s team is one goal ahead in score. This data point is not plotted
in the ﬁgure. The vertical lines indicate the ofﬁcial end of the ﬁrst and second half.
score differences and playing time interval dummies are not statistically signiﬁcant (results are
not reported in Table 6). Also, the regression models in columns (1)–(4) have controls for home
status, a variable indicating the presence of an athletic track, attendance, attendance-to-capacity,
and the experience of players; the estimated coefﬁcients for these variables are in the same order
of magnitude as seen in previous tables, and home status and kickers’ experience are always
statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 percent and 1 percent level respectively. The models in columns
(5) and (6) replicate those of columns (3) and (4) but control for strategies. Again, we see that
kickers’ strategic considerations do not change the results.
A similar picture emerges when one considers other circumstances that are likely to suggest
a higher importance of success or to imply that more is at stake. For example, we would expect
that outcomes of league matches are perceived as being more important towards the end of the
season,buttheprobabilityofchokingisneithersigniﬁcantlyhigherinthesecondhalfoftheseason
(column(3)ofTable6)norischokingunambiguouslymoreprevalentduringthelastroundsofthe
season (column (4) of Table 6). Also I ﬁnd no consistent and signiﬁcant effects when controlling
for the stage of the season by round dummies (not reported). Further exploration of the data
has provided some weak, yet not robust, evidence that choking becomes more likely in the last
matches of the season when the kicker’s team is threatened by relegation. Most other, typically
statistically insigniﬁcant evidence points into the opposite direction; namely that choking rates
tend to fall when more is at stake.652 T.J. Dohmen / J. of Economic Behavior & Org. 65 (2008) 636–653
5. Discussion and conclusion
It is important to keep in mind that we have focused on performance of professionals who are
particularlyskilledatperformingthetaskthathasbeenconsideredhere.Itislikelythatresultsare





tal studies in which subjects typically perform tasks that they do not perform to make their living.
There are several important caveats to the results concerning choking and the size of stakes.
First, we could only study a selected group of players. There is self-selection to the task, because
the player who can best deal with the pressure is most likely to take on the challenge. Second, the
stakesmightstillnothavebeenhighenoughtoobservesigniﬁcantchokingamongthesepressure-
experienced football players. Ideally one would like to be able to observe football players in
situationsinwhichsuccessfulkickingdetermines,forexample,thechampionship.Third,itisdif-
ﬁculttoextrapolatefromtheﬁndingsofthispapertosituationsinwhichonlythefortuneofthetask
performer himself is affected by his performance. Performance assessed in this paper has reper-
cussions on the entire team; needless to say that this could also create pressure from teammates.
In any case, the robust ﬁnding that professional football players are more likely to choke
on a penalty kick when the match takes place on the home turf deserves attention. The ﬁnding,
whichisconsistentwiththehypothesisthatpositivepublicexpectationsorafriendlyenvironment
induceindividualstochoke,hasramiﬁcationsforquestionsofworkplacedesignandperformance
measurement. The empirical result of this paper implies, for example, that workers who might
feeltheyarebeingobserved,especiallybywelldisposedco-workersorspectators,performworse
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Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found, in the online version, at
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